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RECENT DECISIONS
BiLLs AND NOTES-DELIVERY TO IMPOSTER.-The plaintiff was the payee of a
check drawn upon the Irving Trust Co., by the Lincoln Savings Bank. The plain-
tiff's agent specially endorsed this check "Pay to the order of Harry Wolter," and
delivered it to a person who claimed to be Wolter, the owner of a condemnation
award which the plaintiff intended to purchase. All the negotiations for this purchase
were made through third persons. The plaintiff's agent met the alleged owner
on only one occasion, the closing of th sale. The imposter took the check and
endorsed it in Wolter's name to Jacobs who discounted it. This check, bearing the
names of Jacobs and two banks, as subsequent endorsers, was honored by the drawee
who charged the drawer with the face sum. Drawer, in turn, debited the plain-
tiff, its depositor. On discovery of the deception, the plaintiff sought to have the
drawer bank credit her account for the amount of the check.. The drawer im.
pleaded the drawee and endorsers. On appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, held,
two judges dissenting, that the imposter's endorsement was a forgery and void; that
as between the plaintiff and the defendant drawer, the latter is not entitled to debit
the amount of the check and no right may be obtained through or under such
endorsement. The ultimate loss must fall upon Jacobs. Judgment for the plaintiff
affirmed. Cohen v. Lincoln Savings Bank, 276 N. Y. 309, 10 N. E. (2d) 457 (1937).
Where there is a controversy as to the validity and effect of endorsements, when
one who is an imposter gets a negotiable instrument and endorses it, the allega-
tions usually present the issue, whether a forgery has been committed by the
imposter in endorsing. The importance of determining this issue lies in the defense
that may be available to a party sought to be charged after the transfer or
negotiation of the instrument.1  If the imposter's endorsement is a forgery, no
rights may be obtained through.or under such an endorsement.2  If it is not a
forgery, then though an imposter in taking the instrument is guilty of a fraud,
that fraud (unless it be fraud in the factum) merely renders the instrument void-
able against him and those not having the rights of a holder in due course.8  In
1. There are real and personal defenses to negotiable instruments. The former are
available against all holders. The latter are valid defenses only between the immediate
parties and against those not holders in due course, since the instrument has a valid
inception. Forgery is a real defense, as is fraud in the 'factum. Fraud in the treaty
is a personal defense. See NORTON, BiLts AND NoTES (4th ed. 1914) 282 et seq.; Britten,
Fraud in Ahe Inception of Bills and Notes (1923) 9 CoRz;. L. Q. 138.
2. N. Y. Nzaoamr.x INsauamENrs LAw (1909) § 42. The drawer may recover
from the drawee for paying an instrument with a forged endorsement. Halsey v. Bank
of New York, 270 N. Y. 134, 200 N. E. 671 (1936); Schwartz v. Bank of Pitt. Nat.
Ass'n, 283 Pa. 200, 129 AtI. 52 (1925); Labor Bank & Trust Co. v. Cedars, 23 S. W.
(2d) 814 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). The drawer is not estopped though the forger is his
agent. Grand Lodge v. State Bank, 92 Kan. 876, 142 Pac. 974 (1914); Connors Car Co. v.
Manufacturer & Traders Nat. Bank of Buffalo, 124 Misc. 584, 209 N. Y. Supp. 406 (Sup.
Ct. 1925). Cf. Beeson-Moore Stove Co. v. Clark County Bank, 160 Ark. 385, 254 S. W.
667 (1923) ; Yanowe & Co., Inc. v. Am. Ex. Irving Trust Co., 226 App. Div. 530, 234 N. Y.
Supp. 603 (1st Dep't 1929). Here the drawee was not liable to its depositor for paying
his check on a forged endorsement when the money was used for the depositor's benefit
under a contract between the forger and depositor.
3. Holub-Dusha Co. v. Germania Bank, 164 App. Div. 279, 149 N. Y.'Supp. 775 (1st
Dep't 1914); Sherman v. Corn Exchange Bank, 91 App. Div. 84, 86 N. Y. Supp. 341
(1st Dep't 1904); Corinth Bank & Trust Co. v. Security Nat. Bank, 148 Tenn. 136, 252
S. W. 1001 (1923); Heavy v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 27 Utah 222, 75 Pac. 727 (1904).
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this situation a holder in due course, or one having the rights of a holder, may enforce
it against the original drawer and endorsers or acceptor.4 Thus in the instant case,
if the endorsement of the imposter constituted a forgery, the plaintiff would be
awarded the verdict and the loss would fall ultimately upon the defendant Jacobs
(assuming, of course, that the imposter has disappeared), since no good title can be
obtained under a forged endorsement, and Jacobs is the first to endorse after the
imposter. But if the instrument was acquired by fraud in the treaty, the plaintiff
could have no recovery against the drawer, the depositor-bank. All the other
defendants (the drawee and bona fide endorsers) would also escape liability to the
plaintiff. Fraud in the treaty is not available against holders in due course, as
Jacobs and subsequent banks would have been, if this transaction were such a fraud.5
Precedent to a determination of which wrong was committed by the imposter, fraud
or forgery, there must be solved the enigma of the intent of the party transferring to
the imposter.6 The true test is whether or not the endorsement of the name of
the endorser was made by the person who was intended by the transferrer to be
his transferee. If such person endorsed, there is no forgery; 7 it is a fraud.8  If a
person not intended endorsed the instrument, it is a forgery 0
There are two intents which the courts realize may be in the mind of a drawer,
maker, or indorser, when he is defrauded by an imposter. First, be may intend to con-
vey or transfer the title to the instrument to the person physically present before
him.10 Second, he may intend to make the instrument payable to a person who he be-
4. First Nat. Bank v. Am. Exchange Nat. Bank, 170 N. Y. 88, 62 N. E. 1039 (1802).
5. See note 4, supra.
6. ". . . the line is hard to draw between the imposter who appropriates vhat is
intended for another and the imposter who deceives by misrepresenting his responsibility
or character." Strang v. Westchester County Nat. Bank, 235 N. Y. 68, 72, 138 N. E.
739, 741 (1923); Halsey v. Bank of New York, 270 N. Y. 134, 200 N. E. 671 (1936).
Thus if a check is made payable to A on the supposition that be is B, and is delivered
to A in person, title is in A and may be transferred by his endorsement in B's name.
Emperia Bank v. Shotwell, 35 Kan. 360, 11 Pac. 141 (1886); Holub-Dusha Co. v. Ger-
mania Bank, 164 App. Div. 279, 149 N. Y. Supp. 175 (1st Dep't 1914); Land Trust Co.
v. Northwestern Bank, 196 Pa. St. 230, 46 Atl. 420 (1900); cf. Tolman v. American
Exchange Bank, 22 R. I. 462, 48 Atl. 480 (1901).
7. This is the rule laid down in Bank v. Shotwell, 35 Kan. 360, 11 Pac. 141 (1336)
(fraud); Halsey v. Bank of New York, 270 N. Y. 134, 138, 200 N. E. 671, 673 (1936);
Labor Bank & Trust Co. v. Cedars, 23 S. W. (2d) 814 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (forgery).
S. Halsey v. Bank of New York, 270 N. Y. 134, 139, 200 N. E. 671, 673 (1936),
wherein Finch, J., said: "Although one may be deceived as to the name of the man
with whom he is dealing, if he dealt with and intended to deal with the visible person
before him the check may properly be endorsed by the imposter." Montgomery Garage
Co. v. lanufacturer's Liability Insurance Co., 94 N. J. L. 152, 109 At. 295 (1920);
First Nat. Bank v. American Exchange Nat. Bank, 170 N. Y. 83, 62 N. E. 1039 (1902); cf.
Boatsman v. Stockman's Nat. Bank, 56 Colo. 495, 138 Pac. 764 (1914); McHenry v.
National Bank, 85 Ohio St. 203, 97 N. E. 395 (1911).
9. Halsey v. Bank of New York, 270 N. Y. 134, 139, 200 N. E. 671, 673 (1936).
Finch, J., said: "Normally the person intended as payee is identified by his name and
only a person bearing the designated name can properly indorse the chec. Rivara v.
D. L. & W. R. R., 98 N. J. L. 290, 119 At. 6 (1922). For a statement of the burden
of proof of a forgery and the burden of proving an estoppdl, see Bw.Au.', Nzcoor.m
Lsmua -vrs LAw (5th ed. 1932) 302 et seq.
10. Montgomery Garage Co. v. Mahufacture's Liability & Ins. Co., 94 N. J. L. 152,
109 At!. 296 (1920); Halsey v. Bank of New York Trust Co., 270 N. Y. 134, 20 N. E.
1938]
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lieves the imposter to be.1 ' It has been held that where the negotiations between the
parties are through correspondence, the second intention is present.12 In the case
where the imposter is physically present before the transferrer at the time of
delivery the weight of authority13 has decided that the first intent, i.e., the intent
to give title to the instrument to the person actually seen, is the controlling intent.
Now the interesting point of the case at bar is the fact that for the first time,
the limitation is expressly added, that this intent will be found only where the
physical presence of the imposter is coupled with dealings or negotiations with him.
The court insists that this has always been the requirement in New York. These
cases, when examined, 14 reveal that that factual element has indeed been present.
But they are devoid of the express recognition that there must be "dealings or nego-
tiations" as well as physical presence, before the stated intent will be found.
To find, as the court does, that the intent was not to deal with the imposter but with
the real "Wolter" seems sound. The situation here resembles that where all the
communications between the parties are by correspondence. The brief appearance
of the imposter to be introduced to the plaintiff's agent does not make them ma-
terially different. Had there been business-like dealings with the imposter when
plaintiff's agent met him, then there would be ground for the assertion that at the
time of the transfer of the check the plaintiff's agent had intended to deal with
the person physically present. But there were none. The original intent, con-
ceived when plaintiff first became interested, to deal with one could give a valid
assignment of the condemnation award, continued. While it has been said that
this decision impedes the negotiability of paper by casting onus of inquiry upon
subsequent innocent holders, 15 might it not be said that that legal consequence
should not influence the determination of the intention of the transferrer? When-
ever the court decides that a forgery has been committed, either in a face-to-face
671 (1936); Land Title & Trust Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 196 Pa. St. 230, 46 At.
420 (1900); Land Title & Trust Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 211 Pa. St. 211, 60 At,
723 (1905).
11. Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 App. Cas. 459 (1878); Tolman v. American Exchange
Bank, 22 R. I. 462, 48 Aft. 481 (1901); Keel v. Wynne, 210 N. C. 426 (1936).
12. Newberry v. Norfolk So. Ry., 133 N. C. 45, 45 S. E. 356 (1903) ; Cundy v. Lindsay,
3 App. Cas. 459 (1878).
13. United States v. Nat. Exchange Bank, 45 Fed. 163 (C. C. A. 7th, 1891); Robert-
son v. Coleman, 141 Mass. 231, 4 N. E. 619 (1886); Phelps v. McQuade, 220 N. Y. 232,
115 N. E. 441 (1917); Eastern Exchange Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 245 N. Y.
340, 15 N. E. 260 (1927); Gotthelf v. Shapiro, 136 App. Div. 1, 120 N. Y. Supp. 210
(2d Dep't 1909). See WxisToN, CoNAacrs (1920) § 1517; Ashley, Mitual Assent
in Contracts (1903) 3 CoL. L. Rav. 71, 73, 74.
In Phelps v. McQuade, supra, one Walter Gwynne represented himself to the plaintiffs
as being Baldwin Gwynne, a man of good credit. He bought jewelry on credit and sold
it to defendant, an innocent purchaser without notice, who paid value. Plaintiffs brought
replevin, held, though plaintiff intended to sell the goods to a person of credit, the primary
intention was to sell the goods to the person with whom he negotiated.
There are exceptions to the application of the first as the prevailing intent. Where the
named payee was already known to the maker or drawer, or was more particularly identi-
fied on the check in some manner, e.g., description or title, then the second intent pevaU3.
Rossi v. Nat. Bank, 71 Mo. App. 150 (1897); Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Silverman, 148 App.
Div. 1, 132 N. Y. Supp. 1017 (1st Dep't 1911); Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 App. Cas. 459 (1878).
14. See note 12, supra.
15. See (1937) 86 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 209, 210.
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dealing, or in a correspondence transaction, innocent persons may be injured. That
is an unfortunate result of the well settled rule that forgery is a real defense.10
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER TO REGULATE EmxPLor =xNT AGENCIES.--
The state of Illinois passed an act1 which forbade any licensed employment agent
to require an applicant for a position to sign any note authorizing a confession
of judgment for the payment of any fees or any assignment of wages due the appli-
cant or to become due from his employer. Defendant violated these provisions
of the act and was convicted. She appealed, contending that said act was an
unreasonable exercise of the police power and also a violation of Section 12 of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, held, the special
legislative treatment of employment agencies is unreasonable and not a valid exer-
cise of police power. Judgment reversed. People v. Redfeld, 10 N. E. (2d) 341
(Ill. 1937).
Since 1920, the practice of overthrowing state legislation under the purported
authority of the Fourteenth Amendment has become increasingly common.3 The
instant case in this respect is therefore no novelty. Because the legislature singled
out employment agencies for regulation, the lower court held the statute contrary
to the equal protection of law clause, further concluding that it violated the guar-
anty of liberty in that it deprived a person of the right to contract. 4
Granted the premise of special treatment, if some reasonable foundation could
be found for such classification, the court's conclusion might not be sound. While
decrying class legislation, the Supreme Court in the classic case of Barbier v. Con-
nolly5 went on to justify legislation aimed at a public purpose, and limited in its
application, as inviolative of the equal protection clause so long as it affected equally
all persons within the field of its operation. Nor does the mere fact that the regu-
lation concerns a small number cause it to invade equal protection so long as the
evils are peculiar to those regulated. 6 This is held to be a reasonable basis for
16. Nor is there evidence of plaintiff's negligence sufficient to preclude the ue of the
defense of forgery. General Petroleum Products v. Merchants' Trust Co., 11S Conn. 50, 160
AtI. 296 (1932) (the one asserting the estoppel must be free from contributory negli-
gence); Gallo v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 199 N. Y. 222, 92 N. E. 633 (1910); Provident
Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 41 Ohio App. 261, 179
N. E. 815 (1932) (the negligence must be the proximate cause of defendant's reliance).
Cf. Missouri Pacific R. R. v. Cohn Co., 164 Ark. 335, 261 S. IV. 895 (1924) (this cae
factually resembles the principal case. Estoppel was held against the drawer).
1. ILL. Rnv. STAT. Azxr. (Smith-Hurd) c. 48, §§ 197 e, 197 1.
2. § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: ". . . nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
3. Mr. Charles Warren in The Progressiveness of the United States? Supreme Court
(1913) 13 COL. L. REv. 294, stated that of the five hundred and sixty cases concerning
the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment (1887 to 1911),
only three statutes of a social reform type were held unconstitutional.
For an excellent study of the reversal of the Supreme Court from this position and the
Court's alarming interference with state legislation since 1920, see Brown, Due Process,
Police Power and the Supreme Coart (1927) 40 Esnv. L. REV. 943.
4. People v. Redfield, 10 N. E. (2d) 341, 344 (1937).
5. 113 U. S. 27 (1884).
6. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (1884); Mutual Loan Co. v. Martel, 222 U. S.
225 (1911). In the Truax case, supra, Chief Justice Taft distinguishes between the due
1938]
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classification. And when a business has degenerated to such an extent that more
regulation will not suffice to eradicate the evils with which it is surrounded, then
the state may prohibit the business, although innocent parties may be adversely
affected. 7
The due process argument employed by the court in the instant case is only
sound if it can be shown that the invasion caused by the regulation is not a reason-
able exercise of the police power. The courts have recognized that this power,
which is that of. the sovereign to protect and promote the general welfare,8 is
inherent in government and is the fountainhead of laws aimed at the promotion
of the order, morals and general welfare of society, within the limits of the Con-
stitution.9  More than half a century ago, the Supreme Court in Munn v. Illnois,1°
set the stamp of approval upon the use by the states of this power to regulate
business, but limited the scope of the power to those businesses "affected with a
public interest."" This restrictive concept was cemented into the constitutional
mosaic by a line of later cases, notably, Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial
Relations,12 Tyson Bros. v. Banton,15 Ribnik v. McBride,14 and New State Ice Co.
v. Liebinann.'5 The ever-present minority opinions in those cases vigorously urged
process and the equal protection of law clauses by stating that the due process clause
prescribes a minimum of protection for all, whereas the equal protection clause is a guaranty
of equality over and beyond the minimum required by due process.
7. Booth v. ilinois, 184 U. S. 425 (1901). But the mere fact that abuses exist within
a certain field is not sufficient to justify the stern measure of absolute prohibition of that
occupation. So long as nothing inherently dangerous or immoral has developed within
a business, which threatens to render it completely undesirable, prohibition cannot be
prescribed. Regulation must be attempted. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590 (1916);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923).
8. See JNixs, THE STATE mm TnE NAnox (1919) 30-32.
9. See License Cases, 5 How. 504, 583 (U. S. 1847); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass.,
53, 85 (1851).
10. 94 U. S. 113 (1877).
11. The Supreme Court utilized in its opinion the expression "affected with a public
interest" which it borrowed from an English work, D- PoRnMus MAMS, written by Justice
Hale. An excellent account of the history of this manuscript and of the judicial use of
the doctrine is to be found in McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected wvith a Public
Interest (1930) 43 HAuv. L. Rv. 759.
12. 262 U. S. 522 (1923). In the course of denying a state the power to regulate
the meat packing business, the court attempted to classify businesses "affected with a public
interest." Mr. Chief Justice Taft put them in three classes: (1) industries "carried on
under the authority of a public grant of privileges" which imposes the affirmative duty
of rendering a public service; (2) "certain occupations, regarded as exceptional, the public
interest attaching to which . . . has survived"; and (3) "businesses which though not
public at their inception may be fairly said to have risen to be such." Wolff Packing Co.
v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522, 535 (1923).
13. 273 U. S. 418 (1927). An act attempting to limit the resale price of theatre tickets,
etc., was declared unconstitutional since this business was not one "affected with a public
interest" in the sense that it did not fall within one of the categories laid down in Wolff
Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522 (1923).
14. 277 U. S. 350 (1928). Here the court conceded the existence of evils in the em-
ployment agency business but held that the state had no power to fix rates since the
business was a private one, and not affected with a public interest.
15. 285 U. S. 262 (1931). The court held that a state statute attempting to regulate
the ice manufacturing business was void as such business was not affected with a public
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that the true norm for determining whether a police power regulation was valid,
should be the evils resulting from non-regulation and not the "closed-category"
test'6 employed by the majority. That the dissent has at length prevailed is at-
tested to by the recent cases of Nebbia v. New Y'orh, 7 and West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish.'s In the former case the court specifically repudiated the notion that
there is such a thing as a closed category of businesses "affected with a public in-
terest," and laid down the broader test that the circumstances of each case will
determine whether it is the proper subject for police power. Thus it appears that
it is now the actual conditions prevailing in a business which will constitute the
determinants of the validity of regulation.
Yet despite this repudiation, the court in the instant case applied the "cloed
category" concept followed in Ribyik v. McBride,10 that an employment agency is
essentially a private business.20  Under the broader test of public interest adopted
in the later decisions, which embodies the dissent of Justice Stone in the Ribvizi1
case,21 it is clear that an employment agency would be regarded as a business
affecting the public weal and therefore subject to greater regulation.
The principal case attacks the statute on the further ground that it abrogates
the right to contract 2 2 While the right of freedom of contract is important, it is
also noteworthy that it is not an absolute or uncontrolled freedom.p Where the
welfare of the public is concerned, the state has an equally fundamental right
to regulate this freedom.2 The Supreme Court itself has stated that employment
agencies are subject to control and regulation.25  In Ribnih v. McBride, however,
the Court refused to allow control of the abuses of the employment agency business
to be accomplished through the medium of price-fixing, arguing that while the
evils prevalent in a business constitute proper grounds for regulation, that, none-
theless, price-fixing was more than regulation. The Nebbia decision indicates a change
in the Court's attitude; for there price-fixing was permitted as a regulatory measure.
interest and was beyond the regulatory scope of the police power. Cf. O'Gorman & Young
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251 (1931).
16. The "closed category" test, which ferreted out those busine_-es "affected with a
public interest," concerned itself with whether the business had been devoted to a public
use, and whether such use had, in effect, been granted to or by the public. Mr. Justice
Stone, dissenting in Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928), refused to admit the validity
of this definition, which was applied by the majority opinion to employment agencies. To
Justice Stone, the public interest was not the use to which the business was put, but
rather its effect upon the welfare of the public. This, he admitted, was variable according
to changing circumstances, which might inject such an interest into a business otherwise
a matter of private concern.
17. 291 U. S. 502 (1934) (the court upheld the state regulation of the price of mM).
18. 300 U. S. 379 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of a minimum wage law for
women).
19. 277 U. S. 350 (1928).
20. People v. Redfield, 10 N. E. (2d) 341, 343 (Ill. 1937).
21. See note 16, supra.
22. People v. Redfield, 10 N. E. (2d) 341, 344 (IM. 1937).
23. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1397); Adair v. United States, 203 U. S. 161
(1908); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. S49 (1911); West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937).
24. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 591 (1897); Atlantic Coast Line v. River-
side Mlills, 219 U. S. 186, 202 (1911); Stephenson v. Binsford, 287 U. S. 251, 274 (1932).
25. Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U. S. 340 (1916).
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It is possible to argue under the reasoning in the Nebbia case that, if the statute
in question were aimed at the grave abuses with which the business of private em-
ployment agencies is ridden,20 and was a reasonable means of affecting that goal,
then the statute would be upheld. Since the prohibition of the right of a business
to determine its own contract prices was considered a valid regulatory measure in
the Nebbia case, then, despite the fact that the right to the assignment of wages
is a contract right, it too might be prohibited. This would only be true, however,
if the measure were actually regulatory of the employment agencies and not if it
were prohibitive.
It might be argued that the measure in the instant case was prohibitive, because
it directly wiped out the right of assignment of wages. But while it is prohibitive
as to assignments, it is regulatory as to the employment agency business, for it
is this business which is the target-not the practice of assigning wages. In every
regulatory measure, there is usually some element of prohibition.
Another decision of the Supreme Court which might be raised as a barrier against
the regulation in the instant case is that of Adams v. Tanner,2 7 in which the court
refused to uphold a state statute forbidding employment agencies to charge employees
a fee for services rendered. But the statute in that case attempted to go much
further than did the measure in the instant case; for it destroyed not merely the
right to have security for the payment of fees, but the very right to charge em-
ployees for those services.
We are passing through a changing era, experiencing readjustments of our socio-
legal concepts. It is submitted that were the Illinois statute prohibiting the assign-
ment of wages to employment agencies, under the consideration of the Supreme
Court-provided the regulation were reasonable2 8-the cases of Ribnik v. McBride
and Adams v. Turner would not constitute a bar to its constitutionality.
26. In his dissenting opinion in Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 359 (1928), Mr.
Justice Stone pointed out the existence of five great evils running through this particular
business: (1) exorbitant fees were charged for mere application, no attempt being made
to secure posts for the applicants; (2) the fees charged were often discriminatory; (3)
fee-splitting was a common practice; (4) in times of widespread unemployment private
agencies have raised their fees out of all proportion to the reasonable value of their
services; (5) only the employee is charged and not the employer for a service rendered
to both. He also noted that thirty-nine states had enacted statutes regulating or taxing
private employment agencies, but these regulations had not accomplished their purpose.
27. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590 (1916).
28. The court in the instant case did not set forth the facts upon which it reached
the conclusion that the statute was arbitrary. It is interesting to speculate as to the
reasonableness of the statute by comparing it with the evils set forth by Justice Stone.
See note 26, supra. If these comprise the sole evils infesting employment agencies, then
it is difficult to perceive how the statute in the instant case, by prohibiting wage assign-
ments, could provide a remedy for those evils.
It is regrettable, however, that the court did not consider the facts upon which it ar-
rived at the conclusion of arbitrariness, in view of the presumption of constitutionality
which attaches to legislative enactment. McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 529 (1909).
The fact that the state legislature is more conversant than the courts with the actual
conditions which it is attempting to control, and that therefore the overthrow of a statute
is a serious matter, only to be undertaken after a most searching study of the facts sur-
rounding it, should compel the courts to set out the facts upon which it bases its belief
that the regulation attempted is arbitrary.
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CP=nD AL LAw-E-vDENCE--OTHER Cnnms To PR0%o LxTENT..-The defendant
was indicted for the crime of knowingly receiving money for procuring and placing
a particular woman in the custody of another for immoral purposes.' At the
trial evidence was introduced indicating that he had also placed other girls in houses
of prostitution and had taken money from them. On appeal from a judgment of
conviction of the Court of General Sessions, New York County, held, inter clia,
two justices dissenting, that such testimony deprived the defendant of a fair trial.2
Judgment reversed; 3 new trial granted. People v. Montana, 252 App. Di%. 109, 297
N. Y. Supp. 801 (1st Dep't 1937).
It has been well settled at common law as a general rule of evidence' that the
state cannot prove against an accused any crime not alleged in the indictment.5
Such testimony is incompetent to prove guilt even when the defendant's character
is in issue.6 It may not be used to raise an inference that he had committed the
crime charged merely because of habit or predisposition.7  The derivation of this
principle may be traced to the jealous regard for individual liberty set forth in the
Magna Charta.8  But while antiquity may account somewhat for the veneration
with which the courts regard it, there are far more important reasons. It is realized
that a jury may believe, erroneously, that a man is guilty of the crime charged
against him, if it is known that he has committed other similar offenses. The preju-
dice created amounts to an overwhelming injustice Another objection to this
evidence is that the defendant is unduly surprised at the trial when obliged to
contradict accusations of which the indictment gives him no information.1 0 By
confusing his defense, a variety of issues is raised and thus the attention of the
jury is diverted from the question immediately before it.
1. N. Y. PEAL LAw (1910) § 2460 (6), provides: "Any person who -hall knowingly
receive any money or other valuable thing for or on account of procuring and placing
in the custody of another person for immoral purposes any woman, with or without
her consent, shall be guilty of a felony. . ..
2. See People v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y. 559, 595 (1875); People v. Becker, 210 N. Y. 274,
311, 104 N. E. 396, 403 (1914).
3. It is interesting to note that both majority and dissenting opinions conceded that
the evidence adduced against him was sufficient to indicate his guilt beyond all reasonable
doubt.
4. Taliaferro v. United States, 213 Fed. 25 (C. C. A. 5th, 1914); State v. Raymond,
53 N. J. L. 260, 21 At. 328 (1891) ; People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427, 14 N. E. 319 (1837) ;
People v. Harvey, 235 N. Y. 282, 139 N. E. 268 (1923); Regina v. Oddy, 2 Den. 264,
169 Eng. Reprints 499 (1851); see Goersen v. Commonwealth, 99 Pa. 3S3, 393 (1832).
5. Cf. People v. Shea, 147 N. Y. 78, 99, 41 N. E. 505, 511 (1895) where it is stated
that in France the rule is diametrically opposite. It is claimed that entire justice is more
apt to be done if the accused has the questionable benefit of the light to be derived
from the record of his past, his nature, tendencies, associates, practices, and anything
and everything which goes to make up the life of a human being.
6. 'Weiner v. United States, 20 F. (2d) 522 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927); People v. Sharp,
107 N. Y. 427, 14 N. E. 319 (1837).
7. People v. Kohn, 290 Ill. 410. 125 N. E. 293 (1919); People v. Rogers, 324 Ill. 224,
154 N. E. 909 (1926).
S. See People v. Mfolineux, 16S N. Y. 264, 291, 61 N. E. 286, 293, 62 L. R. A. 193
(1901).
9. Shaffner v. Commonwealth, 72 Pa. St. 60 (1872); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 132
Mass. 16 (1382); (1936) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 99.
10. Brashear v. Commonwealth, 178 Ky. 492, 199 S. W. 21 (1917); Ece (1935) 23
CAmxF. L. REv. 530.
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But, the rule has not been without exceptions. There are many acts which are
criminal only upon proof that the accused did the act intentionally and knowingly. 11
Many present day statutes12 make it absolutely necessary for the jury to delve
into the mental processes of the accused by requiring proof of intent. There
the scienter or quo animo is requisite' 3 to the proof. To establish this guilty in-
tent, evidence of other crimes committed by the defendant are often admitted in
evidence. It is acknowledged that generally similar results do not recur by accident.14
A man may once utter a counterfeit bill innocently, but if he has uttered similar
notes on other occasions, his innocence can be disbelieved. 1 The evidence how-
ever is said to be admitted only when the act is one where an explanation by the
defendant that it was done innocently is possible.' 6 Then the district attorney is
permitted to anticipate the defense of accident or mistake or innocence and prove
that the act was not the result of any of these because it was one of a series.
Therefore, in order to prove one basic and essential element, intent not guilt
of a crime charged, this exception 17 was formulated.' 8 Despite this elementary
distinction the courts have misunderstood l and repeatedly hesitated20 to permit
the production of evidence under this exception. 21
11. State v. Van Houten, 2 Penn. 248 (N. J. 1810) (uttering counterfeit money);
People v. Marrin, 205 N. Y. 275, 98 N. E. 474 (1912) (forgery).
12. See N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) §§ 221, 402 for examples.
13. Where intent is immaterial, it is error to admit evidence of other crimes to prove
intent. Chipman v. People, 24 Colo. 520, 52 Pac. 677 (1898).
14. 1 GRExLAvs, Evmxcx. (16th ed. 1899) 71.
15. See note 11, supra.
16. State v. McGann, 8 Idaho 40, 66 Pac. 823 (1901) (intent in homicide); State v.
Roberts, 201 Mo. 702, 100 S. W. 484 (1907) (intent in false pretenses); People v. Love.
joy, 37 App. Div. 52, 55 N. Y. Supp. 543 (3d Dep't 1899) (intent in larceny); State
v. Judd, 74 Utah 398, 279 Pac. 953 (1929) (intent in embezzlement).
17. 1 WHARTON, CamrnrAL EvmENCE (llth ed. 1935) §§ 345, 350. There are five
exceptions in all: (1) motive. Thomas v. United States, 156 Fed. 897 (C. C. A. 8th,
1907) ; (2) intent. People v. Folignos, 322 Ill. 304, 153 N. E. 373 (1926); (3) lack of
mistake or accident. Commonwealth v. Leventhal, 236 Mass. 516, 128 N. E. 864 (1920);
(4) identity of the one charged with the crime. People v. Thau, 219 N. Y. 39, 113
N. E. 556 (1916); (5) common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or
more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other. State
v. Bailey, 190 Mo. 257, 88 S. W. 733 (1905).
18. Cf. Altman v. Ozdoba, 237 N. Y. 218, 142 N. E. 591 (1923) (these rules apply
even to civil cases).
19. 1 GREE.N_.LAr, op. cit. supra, note 14, § 14q.
20. 1 WiGmoRE, Evm: V Nc (2nd ed. 1923) § 357.
21. Inasmuch as this is a definite departure from the general rule, certain conditions
must always exist as a predicate to the admissibility of these other crimes. First, a ground
must be laid implicating the accused with the charge, and unless there is sufficient evi-
dence of this adduced, evidence of all other offenses must be excluded. Kahn v. State,
182 Ind. 1, 105 N. E. 385 (1914). Second, it must be proved that the accused was
concerned in the commission of the collateral offenses. People v. Thoms, 3 Park. Crlm.
Rep. 256 (N. Y. 1855); Scott v. State, 107 Ohio St. 475, 141 N. E. 19 (1923); Regina
v. Harris, 4 F. & F. 342, 176 Eng. Reprints 592 (1864). Accord: State v. Ebel, 92 Mont.
413, 15 P. (2d) 233 (1932) (need not be beyond a reasonable doubt). Third, there must
be some connection between the other crime and the crime charged. Hunter v. State,
165 S. E. 314 (Ga. 1932); People v. King, 276 Ill. 138, 114 N. E. 601 (1916); Hughes
v. State, 51 Okla. 11, 299 Pac. 240 (1931). Fourth, in the charge to the jury, It is in-
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In the instant case an argument might be made for the admission of evidence
that the defendant procured other prostitutes and received money therefor. The
statute2 2 required that the accused "knowingly" receive the money. "Knowingly"
means intentionally and "with knowledge of the essential facts";2 it indicates
that the defendant knew what he was about to do and with such knowledge pro-
ceeded to do the act charged.24  Yet under the facts, the explanation by the de-
fendant that the act was without knowledge and unintentional was not impossible.
For example, a story that he was acting as employment agent and was receiving
money for having placed the woman as a domestic, or possibly that the money
was payment of a check might have been his defense. It is impossible for the
People to know how much evidence the accused might rally to his defense to show
the absence of intention to commit the crime. Therefore the court should have
permitted the district attorney to reduce the possibility of the defendant's suc-
cessfully showing mistake, by proving a common plan.p Instead, the court decided
that, though his intent was material, it could be inferred from the very nature of
the act. Is the court to say the inference of intent is already conclusively proved
when this act is shown, and that therefore this added evidence is unnecessary? It
seems the court would then be invading the province of the jury25 which invasions
should be discouraged in criminal cases.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-DECEDENT'S E STATE-THE rFFECT or A TRUST UPON
THE SURVPIING SPOUSE'S STATUTORY SHAmE OF Tim DECEAsED'S ESTATE.-Ferdinand
Straus' will contained a provision whereby one-third of his estate was to be set
aside in trust, the income thereof to go to his wife for life. Later he executed
a trust agreement by which all his property was transferred to the trustees. He
reserved the right to modify or revoke the trust and retained control of the trustees.
The income was to go to Straus for life, the plaintiff, Nevman, being named the
beneficiary thereafter. The purpose of this trust was to defeat his wife's right
to share in his estate. Three days later he died. In this action, the plaintiff
seeks to compel the trustees to carry out the terms of the trust, held, that since the
alleged transfer was illusory, intended only as a mask for the effective retention by
the settlor of the property which in form he had transferred, no valid trust was
created. Newman v. Dore, 275 N. Y. 371, 9 N. E. (2d) 966 (1937).
The right of a surviving spouse to take a certain share of the deceased's estate
under the statute, Section 18 of the Decedent Estate Law,1 is purely inchoate during
cumbent upon the trial court, when requested, to instruct the jury to consider the evi-
dence only to negative the presumption of innocent intent and not as to whether the
accused committed the act. 1 GRr.ENA, op. cit. supra, note 14, § 14 q. Compare People
v. Folignos, 332 I1. 304, 153 N. E. 373 (1926) (error not to so charge when requested)
with Martin v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. Rep. 125, 35 S. W. 976 (1896) (error not to so charge,
even when not requested).
22. See note 1, supra.
23. People v. McCalla, 63 Cal. App. 783, 790, 220 Pac. 436, 440 (1923).
24. United States v. Claypool, 14 Fed. 127 (W. D. Blo. 1882).
25. Weyman v. People, 4 Hun 511, aff'd, 62 N. Y. 623 (1875); State v. Schuman,
89 Wash. 9, 153 Pac. 1034 (1915).
26. Higgins v. State, 157 Ind. 57, 60 N. E. 685 (1901).
1. DEc. EsT. LA (1930) § is was enacted to enlarge the interect of the srving
spouse. As a part of the legislative program, Rr%r ProP. L.%w (1930) § 190 abolLhed
the wife's former right of dower. Bodner v. Feit, 247 App. Div. 119, 121, 2856 N. Y.
Supp. 814, 816 (1st Dep't 1936).
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the lifetime of both parties.2 The purpose of the statute is to enlarge the right
of the surviving spouse in the deceased's estate and at the same time to permit an
easy transfer of property during their joint lives.3 Thus, during his lifetime, under
the statute, one spouse may waste, transfer, or give away his property; but he
cannot limit the surviving spouse's share by testamentary disposition to less than
the statutory share.4 During their joint lives neither can attack a transfer of gift
as defeating his or her interest, since that interest is merely expectant.5
Since the deceased, in the instant case, had the right to transfer or give away
his property, the question arises as to whether he created a valid trust. In some
jurisdictions, the test applied to determine the validity of a trust made under cir-
cumstances similar to the case at hand is whether the settlor's motive was to defeat
his wife's interest in the property. If the answer were found to be in the affirma-
tive, the trust was declared to be invalid.0 However, the test adopted in other
jurisdictions, 7 including New York,8 is whether the settlor really divested himself
of title and transferred the property to the trustee.
In determining which is the better rule it is necessary to look to the purpose of
the statute in question. This objective, it has been stated, is twofold: first, to
permit an easy transfer of property during the lifetime of both spouses; secondly,
to enlarge the surviving spouse's right to the deceased spouse's estate.9 The alien-
ability of property is not promoted by the "motive" test which permits a sur-
viving spouse to attack transfers made during their joint lives on grounds difficult
to rebut. For it might prove hard to establish that the deceased spouse's motive
was not spiteful as the surviving spouse claims, particularly since the transferor
is dead. On this ground it becomes apparent that the easy transfer of property might
be definitely hindered. However, when it is realized that the surviving spouse's right
to an enlarged share of the estate is the more important purpose of the statute 0
2. Matter of Clark, 149 Misc. 374, 284 N. Y. Supp. 253 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
3. Bodner v. Feit, 247 App. Div. 119, 286 N. Y. Supp. 814 (1st Dep't 1936); In re
Bommer's Estate, 159 Misc. 511, 288 N. Y. Supp. 396 (Surr. Ct. 1935). For interpreta-
tions of similar statutes in other jurisdictions, see Jaworski v. Wisniewski, 149 Md.
109, 131 Atl. 40 (1925) ; Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. St. 149, 21 Atl. 809 (1891).
4. Matter of Byrnes, 260 N. Y. 465, 184 N. E. 56 (1933).
5. Herrman v. Jorgenson, 263 N. Y. 348, 189 N. E. 449 (1934); Matter of McCulloch's
Will, 263 N. Y. 408, 189 N. E. 473 (1934); Bierne v. Equitable Title and Trust Co., 307
Pa. 570, 161 Atl. 721 (1932). But see (1934) 8 Tinu. L. Q. 531.
6. Payne v. Tatem, 236 Ky. 306, 33 S. W. (2d) 2 (1930); Dyer v. Smith, 62 Mo. App.
606 (1895); Evans v. Evans, 78 N. H. 352, 100 Atl. 671 (1917); Thayer v. Thayer,
14 Vt. 107, 39 Am. Dec. 211 (1842).
7. Rabbitt v. Gaither, 67 Md. 96, 8 Ati. 744 (1887); Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass.
458, 63 N. E. 1068 (1902); Benkart v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 269 Pa. 257, 112 Atl.
62 (1920); Hall v. Hall, 109 Va. 117, 63 S. E. 420 (1909).
8. Prior to the instant case, the only ruling on this point in New York was In Bodner
v. Feit, 247 App. Div. 119, 286 N. Y. Supp. 814 (1st Dep't 1936). In that case the court
held that a spouse may not strip himself of his property for the sole purpose of defeating
his wife's statutory right. But see (1936) 50 HARV. L. RFv. 529; (1936) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q.
REv. 101. In the instant case, however, the court emphatically asserts that the test to
be applied is whether there was an illusory or a real transfer of title.
9. The intent of the legislature to enlarge the surviving spouse's share in the deceased's
estate is mentioned in N. Y. LAws 1929, c. 229, § 20.
10. While RaAL PROP. LAW (1930) § 190 facilitated the transfer of property by abol-
ishing dower, the primary purpose of Dac. EsT. LAw (1930) § 18 is to enlarge the sur-
viving spouse's interest in the deceased's estate. For a discussion of the N. Y. Decedent
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and that a trust against public policy may be deemed to be invalid,"' this rule
has its merit.
Under the rule, herein adopted by New York12 the inter-vios transfer of property
is undoubtedly unhindered. Probably the strongest argument in favor of this rule
is that it prevents the surviving spouse from attacking transfers of property and
gifts made by the deceased during his lifetime merely on grounds of motive. 3 The
letter of the law seems to indicate that this latter test is the better but the spirit
of the law favors the former test. A spiteful spouse who contrives to defeat his
wife's interest in his estate certainly does not deserve the protection of this statute.
Applying the test which was adopted by the court in the instant case, it is
necessary to determine whether the settlor really divested himself of the title
to the property. It is seen that the settlor reserved to himself the income of the
trust for life and also the power to modify or revoke the trust. Whether these
are strong enough reasons to declare the trust invalid the court, in the instant case,
expressly refuses to answer. However, the settlor also retained the right to con-
trol the trustees. With all the other powers reserved by the settlor, this right to
control revested in the settlor every legal right over the property which he had had
before he had executed the trust agreement.Y5 The trustee merely had the duty
of handing over the income to the settlor. In a valid trust agreement the trustee
has a responsible position. He has control over the trust property and must give
an account to the cestui, and not to the settlor.16  The settlor, controlling the
trustee, was in fact a principal; the trustee, his agent.17 Since there was no valid
transfer of title, there was no trust created. And the property, not having passed
to the trustee, is a part of the deceased's estate in which the wife has the right
to take her share given to her under the will.' 8
By this decision, which the court expressly said applies only to the facts of
the case, Section 18 of the Decedent Estate Law is properly enforced without pre-
venting a bona fide transfer of property or diminishing the wife's enlarged property
rights. Yet, under the test adopted in this case, a surviving spouse might very
easily be deprived of the interest that the statutory law intends her to have.
Estate Commission's aims and purposes in recommending this section to the legilature
see In re Bommer's Estate, 159 lisc. 511, 288 N. Y. Supp. 419 (Surr. CL 1936).
11. Donaldson v. Thousand Springs Power Co., 29 Idaho 735, 162 Pac. 334 (1917);
In re Devlin's Trust, 248 Pa. 11, 130 Atl. 238, (1925); Hollister v. McCarney, 115
Tex. 49, 274 S. W. 562 (1925).
12. See footnote 8, supra.
13. See Bodner v. Felt, 247 App. Div. 119, 124, 286 N. Y. Supp. 814, 819 (1st. Dep't
1936).
14. "Question of whether reservation of the income or of a power of revocation, or
both, might even without reservation of a power of control be sufficient to shov that
the transfer was not intended in good faith to divest the settlor of his property must
await decision until such question arises." New, man v. Dore, 275 N. Y. 371, 381, 9 N. E.
(2d) 966, 969 (1937). CJ. Kelley v. Snow, 185 Mass. 288, 70 N. E. 89 (1904); Windolph
v. Gerard Trust Co., 245 Pa. 349, 91 AUt. 634 (1914).
15. Brownell v. Briggs, 173 Mlass. 529, 54 N. E. 251 (1889); Leonard v. Leonard,
181 lass. 458, 63 N. E. 1068 (1902).
16. Ex rel. KanFas City Theological Sem. v. Ellison, 216 S. W. 967 ('.%o. 1919).
17. Brownell v. Briggs, 173 Mass. 529, 54 N. E. 251 (1889); Leonard v. Leonard, 181
Mass. 458, 63 N. E. 1068 (1902).
18. DEC. EsT. LAW (1930) § 18 specifies that the surviving spouse's minimum Ehare
is a life interest in one-third of the deceased's estate where there are children. Since
the deceased husband's will, in the instant case, gave the wife that proportion, the statute




EVIDENE-RES GEsTAE.-The plaintiff, administratrix of the estate of the deceased,
brought an action to recover for his death alleging it to have resulted from the
negligence of the defendant railroad. Evidence that the deceased, shortly after his
injury cried out "Save me. Help me-why did that conductor close the door on me?"
was excluded by the trial court as narrative of a past event. On appeal from a
judgment dismissing the complaint at the end of the plaintiff's case, held, two justices
dissenting, judgment affirmed. The plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case.
The evidence was properly excluded. Handel v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 252
App. Div. 142, 297 N. Y. Supp. 216 (2d Dep't 1937).
Here is a decision in which one feels that the result would have been different had
it not been for the fact that an unfortunate misuse of words has crept into our cases.
In the law of evidence two great classes of utterances have been admitted as part
of the res gestae :1 (1) utterances contemporaneous with and elucidating the transaction
in issue2 and (2) declarations which are made spontaneously following an exciting
event.3 The first class may be called "verbal acts." Under this name an utterance
accompanying an equivocal act, itself material and which serves to explain the act and
give it legal significance, may be received. 4 The second class of utterances may be
called "spontaneous declarations." In this second class are included spontaneous
statements, made by an observer or participant immediately after an exciting event,
declaring the circumstances of the event. While logically only those utterances which
accompany and elucidate the transaction in issue should be said to be part of the res
gestae6 still the great body of the decisions admit both classes on the same ground, i.o.,
that they are part of the res gestae.7 Historically, however, it seems that "spontaneous
declarations" were admissible on distinct grounds. In Thompson v. Trevanions a
spontaneous declaration was admitted without reference to res gestae because it was
felt that, the time elapsed after the injury being too short in which to contrive a false-
hood, the words should be allowed in evidence in explanation of the action. But
1. The intolerable vagueness of the term res gestae has been criticized. TUAYEm, LEwAL
ESSAYS, B INUMGrM's CAs-DcLARATIONS AS PART or TuE REs GEsTAE (1927) 207. Its
usefulness is denied. 3 WIXGORE, EvIDEcE (2d ed. 1923) § 1767; Morgan, A Suggested
Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 229; Ireton, Verbal
Acts and Spontaneous Declarations (1936) 24 Ky. L. J. 122.
2. Lund v. Inhabitants of Tyngsborough, 9 Cush. 36 (Mass. 1851).
3. Scheir v. Quirin, 77 App. Div. 624, 78 N. Y. Supp. 956 (4th Dep't 1902), afJ'd, 177
N. Y. 568, 69 N. E. 1130 (1904); People v. Curtis, 225 N. Y. 519, 122 N. E. 623 (1919);
State v. Murphy, 16 R. 1. 528, 17 At]. 998 (1889).
4. 3 WIG1ORE, EVDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1745 et seq.
5. 3 WsaaroRE, loc. cit. supra note 3.
6. People v. Del Vermo, 192 N. Y. 470, 85 N. E. 690 (1908). Judge Bartlett, id. at 484,
85 N. E. at 695, speaking of Commonwealth v. Hackett, 2 Allen 136 (Mass. 1861) says:
"Strictly speaking, the spontaneous declaration there under consideration did not really
form part of the res gestae, as being itself a verbal act contemporaneous with the principle
occurrence; for the exclamation was uttered after the act of stabbing had been wholly
completed and after the assailant had fled, although it is true that the time which had elapsed
was very short." Patterson v. Hochster, 38 App. Div. 398, 56 N. Y. Supp. 467 (2d Dep't
1899). Herein the court divided declarations admissible as part of the res gestae Into three
classes. It was pointed out that although they were all admitted on the same ground as
being part of the res gestac that logically this was error.
7. Commonwealth v. M'Pike, 3 Cush. 181 (Mass. 1849) (the first case in America to
admit as part of the res gestae a declaration not accompanying the transaction) ; Travelers'
Ins. Co. v. Sheppard, 85 Ga. 751, 12 S. E. 18 (1890). Also cases cited in note 3, supra.
. 8. Skinn. 402, 90 Eng. Reprints 179 (1694).
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later Lord Ellenborough set the fashion for admitting "spontaneous declarations" as
part of the res gestae by stating that in Thompson v. Tre''anion the ground for ad-
missibility was the res gestae9 and now this has become a general practice.
It is this interpretation of res gestae which would admit "spontaneous declarations"
upon the ground of being part of the res gestac that has caused an unfortunate result.
The term has been stretched by judicial interpretation beyond its original boundaries.
To appear to be correct in their use of the phrase res gestac and to avoid recognizing
"spontaneous declarations" as a distinct exception to the hearsay rule,10 the courts
have held the term contemporaneous to include utterances which in fact were not
contemporaneous. 11 Thus in Commonwealth v. Hackett- the declaration, "I am
stabbed-I am gone-Dan Hackett has stabbed me," uttered immediately after the
alleged homicidal act, was spoken of as a statement contemporary with the main
transaction and admitted as being original evidence in the nature of res gestae. This
tendency to look only to the phrase res gestac for warrant in the admission of evidence
has led in some instances to the exclusion of evidence which should have been admitted
on the independent ground of being a "spontaneous declaration." It seems that when
the time elapsed between the declaration and the act in issue is so great as to make
the courts feel that to admit it would be to stretch too violently the term "con-
temporaneous," they keep the declaration out. The evidence is excluded although as a
"spontaneous declaration" its admission is justifiable. Thus in Rex. v. Bedingfield,13
the declaration of the deceased, while rushing from the house, "Oh, aunt, see what
Bedingfield has done to me" was excluded because not said while something was being
done, but was said after something had been done. Certainly, however, the words
were spontaneous in character and spoken so closely after the event as to preclude
fabrication.
So in the case at bar, the declaration of the deceased made a little over two and
one-half minutes after the accident was said to be narrative of a past event and was
held not admissible as part of the res gestac. The logic of Thompsont v. Trevanion,
the case initiating the proposition that "spontaneous declarations" are admissible, would
seem to be satisfied. Also the utterance was not made in answer to any question.14
The words "Save me. Help me," indicate spontaneity as does the fact that the latter
part of the sentence was in question form. Concerning the element of time, it is
demanded that the utterance be made within such a limit of time as presumably
to preclude fabrication. It can reasonably be argued that the deceased's utterance
came within the confines of this rule for it was made within two and one-half minutes
after the accident while still in a state of severe shock and while suffering from fatal
injuries.15 The dissenting opinion seems to hold the declaration admissible as a
9. Aveson v. Kinnaird, 6 East 133, 193, 102 Eng. Reprints 1253, 1261 (1805).
10. The hesitancy of the courts to look upon 'spontaneous declarations" as a dhtinct
exception to the hearsay rule is hard to understand. Although only firmly established since
the middle of the last century, it is curious to recall that the doctrine of "spontaneous
declarations" came into existence in 1694. This was after the term res gesiac first app2ared
in 1637 (Proceedings in the Case of Ship Money, 3 Howell's State Trials 825, 983) (3 Wican,
EVIDMeCE (2d. ed. 1923) § 1767) but before any doctrine of res gcstae had come into being.
11. See note 6, supra.
12. 2 Alien 136 (Mass. 1361).
13. 14 Cox C. C. 341 (1379).
14. This circumstance was emphasized in Greener v. General Elec. Co., 209 N. Y. 135,
138, 102 N. E. 527, 528 (1913).
15. For an interesting psychological inquiry into the importance of the elements of time
and schock in relation to "spontaneous declarations" see Hutchins & Slesinga, Some
Observations on the Lae, of Evdence (1928) 28 CoL. L. REv. 432.
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"spontaneous declaration" and certainly the test there applied is the proper one for a
"spontaneous declaration." The minority asks, "(1) Was the declaration 'spon-
taneously expressive of the injured person's observation' of the occurrence? (2) Was
the utterance made 'within such limit of time as to presumably preclude fabrica-
tion?' "L6 No attempt was made to demand that the utterance be one elucidating or
characterizing the main fact in issue; nor was it demanded that the utterance be one
accompanying the transaction.
To admit "spontaneous declarations" only as part of the res gestae is to impose the
same restrictions upon them as upon "verbal acts."'1  The dissent avoided this by
favoring admissibility under the authority of a case18 which recognized "spontaneous
declarations" as something apart from res gestae. The utterance was regarded simply
as an after declaration and as such, under the circumstances of the case, it was
attempted to be justified. Historically, the standard set up by the dissent, liberal
though it may be, is not new. The minority avoids the confusion initiated by Lord
Ellenborough by recognizing "spontaneous declarations" without recourse to the logic
of "verbal acts" or the phraseology of res gestae.
NEGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE CAUSE-INTERVENING Act.-The plaintiff's testator was
killed when an automobile in which he was riding as a guest, struck a freight car
of defendant which was standing upon a crossing of a paved and well traveled state
highway. The train was in that position for twenty minutes without lights. The night
was dark and it was snowing. The car skidded on the the ice under the snow covering
the highway, while trying to stop. On appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, held,
one judge dissenting, that the ice was the sole proximate cause of the death. Judgment
reversed. Megan v. Stevens 91 F. (2d) 419 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937).
To hold a defendant liable in cases of this kind, the jury must first find that the
defendant was negligent, then that this negligence was the cause-in-fact of the
injury done and finally that the negligence was the legal and proximate cause. 1
Numerous tests have been devised by the courts and text writers for the determination
of the question of legal cause.2 The most often used test, the "foreseeable consequence"
rule,3 is that if the particular harm sustained was a foreseeable consequence of the
defendant's conduct, then the negligence of the defendant is the legal and proximate
16. Handel v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 252 App. Div. 142, 148, 297 N. Y. Supp.
216, 223 (1937).
17. In Patterson v. Hochster, 38 App. Div. 398, 56 N. Y. Supp. 467 (2d Dep't 1899)
such restrictions were consciously imposed. The court, id. at 401, 56 N. Y. Supp. at 469, says:
"However, such declarations being received in evidence as part of the res gestae, they must be
subject to the same rule as applies to other declarations forming part of the res gestae."
18. People v. Del Vermo, 192 N. Y. 470, 85 N. E. 690 (1908).
1. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928); Osborne v.
Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N. W. 372 (1931); REsTATEmENT, ToRrs, (1935) § 305;
Carpenter, Workable Rides for Determining Proximate Cause (1932) 20 CAMIF. L. REv. 229.
2. For a full discussion of these tests see, Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining
Proximate Cause, Part I (1932) 20 CALrF. L. REv. 229; Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of
Tort (1911) 25 HARV. L. REv. 103; Beale, Proximate Consequences (1920) 33 HARv. L. REv.
633; McLaughlin, Proximate Cause (1925) 39 HARv. L. REV. 149; Harper, Absolute Liability
and Proximate Cause (1932) 32 Mic-. L. REv. 1001.
3. Gilland v. Portland Crematorium Ass'n, 120 Ore. 286, 249 Pac. 627 (1926); Hamilton




cause of the injury and, therefore, the defendant is liable.4 The problem however
becomes complex when a force other than the defendant's negligence may have been
more immediately responsible for the injury. Such a force is known as an intervening
force 5 a concurring force, 6 or a condition.7
In the instant case the court holds that the ice was the sole proximate cause of the
injury, and not the blocking of the highway and the failure to give adequate and timely
warning, or the failure to uncouple the cars and leave the roadway clear. The court
feels that it is too speculative to say that had proper warning been given or had the
cars been uncoupled the automobile would have avoided the collision.8 The ice was
therefore an intervening cause and the rule that the defendant is not liable applies.0
The dissent points out however, that the blocking of the highway without giving
adequate warning was negligence to all persons travelling thereon; that the ice was a
concurring cause ° and therefor applied the rule, permitting plaintiff recovery.1 1
The dissent is undoubtedly the more sound of the two views, although not entirely
satisfactory. It is submitted that the ice was neither an intervening or concurring
cause, but an existing fact upon which the defendant's negligence operated.12 It was a
natural phenomenon not unusual at the time of the year, or at that place.10  The
jury, in finding negligence, might well have concluded that had the train crew acted as
reasonably prudent persons, they would have foreseen a slippery condition on the
highway and would have uncoupled the cars. They might have decided that warning
alone would not have sufficed to prevent injury to those on a road as icy as this one.
The ice therefor would have been one of the factors or circumstances which made the
4. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469 (1876); Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v.
McBride, 36 F. (2d) 841 (1930) ; Beatty v. Dunn, 103 Vt. 340, 154 AtL 770 (1931).
5. An intervening force has been defined as a "force which is neither operating in the
defendant's presence, nor at the place where the defendant's act takes effect at the time of
the defendant's act, but comes into effective operation at or before the time of the damage."
McLaughlin, Proxinzate Cause (1925) 39 H~nv. L. REv. 149, 159.
6. Concurring causes or forces are those causes in operation at the same time either one
of which independent of the other may have caused the injury. Herr v. City of Lebanon,
149 Pa. 222, 24 At. 207 (1892).
7. A third influence is possible and the courts have termed it an existing fact or condition.
An existing fact is not truly an efficient force, but a circumstance or condition existing at
the time of the negligence, upon which the defendant's force acts in producing harm. Such
a force does not excuse defendant. See, The Santa Rita, 173 Fed. 413, 416 (N. D. Cal.
1909), rev'd on other grounds, 176 Fed. 890 (1909); State v. O'Brien, 81 Iowa 3S, 46 N. W.
752 (1890) ; Derry v. Flitner, 118 Mass. 131 (1875) ; Larson v. Boston Elev. Ry., 212 Mass.
262, 9S N. E. 1048 (1912) (disease in the body before negligent conduct); Watson v.
Rheinderknecht, 82 Minn. 235, 84 N. W. 798 (1901); Carpenter, Workable RU14s for De-
termining Proximate Cause, Part MI (1932) 20 CAL. L. REv. 471, 476; McLaughlin, Proxi-
nzate Cause (1925) 39 HA.v. L. REV. 149, 160.
S. Megan v. Stevens, 91 F. (2d) 419, 422 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937).
9. Seith v. Commonwealth Elect. Co., 241 Ill. 252, 89 N. E. 425 (1909) (wire struck by
policeman's dub); Perry v. Rochester Lime Co., 219 N. Y. 60, 113 N. E. 529 (1916) (boys
stole nitroglycerine caps); Bartlett v. Boston Gas Light Co., 122 Mass. 209 (1877) (tenant
in possession was negligent when gas escaped).
10. Megan v. Stevens, 91 F. (2d) 419, 426 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937).
11. Brehm v. Great Western R. R., 34 Barb. 256 (1861); Philadelphia & Reading R. R.
v. Anderson, 94 Pa. St. 356 (1880); Davis v. Vermont Central R. R., 55 Vt. 84 (1832);
Salisbury v. Herchenroder, 106 Mass. 458 (1871).
12. See note 7, supra. Also, Rosenbaum v. Shoffner, 93 Tenn. 624, 40 S. W. 1036 (1397).
13. Megan v. Stevens, 91 F. (2d) 419, 425 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937).
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defendant's conduct negligent. The majority does not give sufficient weight to the
fact that the jury might have found this to be the basis of negligence under the given
charge.' 4 Considering this as the finding of the jury, it is not too "speculative" to say
that the failure to uncouple the cars resulted in the collision.
But while these considerations rebut the notion that charging the defendant is
"speculative" they lead only to the conclusion that defendant's negligence was the
cause-in-fact of the injury. Was it also the legal and proximate cause?1r The ice
was not an intervening cause, because it was a static condition operating in the
presence of the defendant in and at the time of the defendant's act. 0 It was not
a concurring cause because it would not have caused the death without the defendant's
negligence, i.e., skidding would not have occurred.' 7 It was therefor merely a condition
to be taken with all the circumstances of the case in determining whether the de-
fendant's conduct was that of a reasonably prudent person. A defendant is not
excused when the contributing influence is merely a condition.18
It appears from the verdict of the jury that the injury was thought to be a con-
sequence which the defendant ought to have foreseen and guarded against by un-
coupling the cars. The defendant's negligence would then be the legal cause of the
injury, under the "foreseeable consequence" rule, and he should pay the damages.
Thus, to follow the majority and relieve the defendant of liability is to absolve him
by referring to the very factors which made his conduct negligent.' 0
SALES-ORAL SALE OF GOODS ALREADY IN BUYER'S POSSESSION.-The litigants made
an oral agreement wherein the defendant was to purchase stock in a cooperative apart-
ment building. The sale carried with it the right to occupy an apartment in the
building, in which the defendant already resided as lessee. Defendant asked whether
the sale included some draperies. The plaintiff replied "Very well, the draperies are
yours." Before the delivery of the stock and payment of the first installment, defendant
withdrew from the transaction. His defense to the present suit for breach of contract
is the Statute of Frauds. Plaintiff appeals from an order dismissing the complaint
contending there was sufficient acceptance and receipt to take the case out of the
statute, held, one judge dissenting, acceptance may not be shown by mere words when
the buyer has possession of the goods. Judgment affirmed. Maker v. Randolph, 275
N. Y. 80, 9 N. E. (2d) 786 (1937).
No contract for the sale of merchandise valued at fifty dollars or more will be
14. The charge below indicated that the jury should consider the time and circumstances
of the stop at the crossing, including weather conditions, and whether the blocking was
necessary, to determine if the act was negligent.
15. Id, at 421. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 248 N. Y. 339, 351, 162 N. E. 99, 101
(1928), dissenting opinion, Andrews C. J. See also note 1, supra.
16. See Parmenter v. City of Marion, 113 Iowa 297, 85 N. W. 90, 92, (1901); also, note
5, supra.
17. See note 6, supra.
18. See note 7, supra. HAER, ToRTs (1933) § 111.
19. The majority indicates that if the jury found that the presence of the car on the
crossing was negligence, it was against the evidence. Megan v. Stevens, 91 F. (2d) 419, 423
(C. C. A. 8th, 1937). They argue that there was no negligence because the train crew would
not he required to anticipate the inability of the car to stop after timely warning. This
argument is answerable on three grounds: (1) They had already conceded the conduct to be
negligent. Id. at 422. (2) The jury found the conduct to be negligent and this is in their
province, where reasonable men might differ. Id. at 427. (3) The failure to give warning was
not the only negligence charged. Id. at 421.
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enforced, unless the buyer has accepted part of the goods so sold and actually
received them, or unless there is some Written evidence of the sale signed by the
parties. This provision of the Statute of Frauds,' and the rule interpreting the statute
was applied to the instant case by the court in the same manner as the court would
have done some four score years ago, and this was done, notwithstanding some
apparent authority to the contrary contained in pertinent provisions of the Uniform
Sales Act, which was enacted in the interim.
The New York rule was first announced in the leading case of Shindler v. Housto".2
In this case the court held, two judges dissenting, that the words of the seller "the
lumber is yours," after both parties had agreed on the price, and the lumber was in
plain sight of both, was not an acceptance and delivery sufficient to take the case out
of the Statute of Frauds. This was a strict adherence to the letter of the statute.
Not only has this rule been applied to proposed sales where the goods were bullky and
hence hardly susceptible to manual delivery, as was the situation in the Shihdler case,
but it has also been applied when the sale concerned an article already in the posesion
of the purchaser.3
The view adopted by New York on this question was followed in some other
states.4 But many jurisdictions announced a less stringent construction of the
statute.5 The liberal view of the statute is founded on a belief that the statute was not
intended as a bar to the reception of parol evidence or an attempt to do away with
its use. Parol evidence may be given, supplemented by the requisites provided for in
the statute.6 Acceptance of goods might be spelled out from the buyer's posseszion
of the goods, according to one authority.- As to receipt, when the buyer already has
possession as bailee, there should be some evidence of dominion over the goods in the
new capacity as owner. This evidence may consist either of acts which are incon-
sistent with his former status in relation to the property as pledgee or bailee, or it may
1. N. Y. PERs. PRoP. LAW (1909) § 31.
2. 1 N. Y. 261 (134). The court said, per Wright, J., "The uniform doctrine of the
cases, however, has been, that in order to satisfy the statute there must be something more
than mere -words-that the act of accepting and receving required to dispznie with a note in
writing, implies more than a simple act of the mind .... " Shindler v. Houston, 1 N. Y. 261,
268 (184S).
3. Dorsey v. Pike, 50 Hun 534, 3 N. Y. Supp. 730 (1839); Caulkins v. Hellman, 47
N. Y. 449 (1S72); Cooke v. Mlilliard, 65 N. Y. 352 (1375); Duplex Safety Boiler Co. v.
McGuiness, 64 How. Pr. 99 (N. Y. 1882) (defendant bad done no act which was incon-
sistent with prior possession).
4. Brunswick Grocery Co. v. Lamar, 116 Ga. 1, 42 S. E. 366 (1902); Dehority v.
Pamson, 97 Ind. 253 (1330); Calvert v. Schultz, 143 Mich. 441, 106 N. W. 1123 (196);
Silkman Lumber Co. v. Hundolz, 132 Wis. 610, 112 N. W. 1031 (1907) ; Friedman v. Pious,
158 Wis. 435, 149 N. W. 218 (1914).
5. Wilson v. Hotchkiss, 171 Cal. 617, 154 Pac. 1 (1915) (vendee's dcclarations may be
given to show the fact of his complete ownership) ; Snider v. Thrall, 56 Wis. 674, 14 N. W.
814 (1333); BRowN, STATUr OF FRAUDS (5th ed. 1895) § 321(e). "The conduct of the
buyer showing an acceptance... may be drawn ... from what he does and says!'
6. 1 Wmr.usroz, SAL.zs (2d ed. 1924) § 37; Burdick, A Statute For Promoting Fraud
(1916) 16 COL. L. R v. 273, 279; Calkins v. Lockwood, 17 Conn. 154 (1845) (delivery by
spoken word); Moreland v. Newberger Cotton Co., 94 Aliss. 572, 43 So. 137 (1909).
7. 1 WI-sToX, SArTS (2d ed. 1924) § 90. Contra: Charlotte Harbor & N. Ry. Co. ,.
Burwell, 56 Fla. 217, 43 So. 213 (1909); Godkin v. Weber, 154 Mch. 207, 114 N. W. 924
(1903) (where the court demanded further action from the buyer before acceptance was
deemed valid).
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be shown by his declarations that he so holds as owner.3 The English rule is in
accord with this more liberal interpretation of the Statute of Frauds.0 New York
courts, however, have always uniformly sought some further act on the part of the
buyer before they would admit such an acceptance and receipt as would take the case
out of the Statute. of Frauds. Declarations were never enough.10
New York adopted the Uniform Sales Act in 1911; therein'1 we find a subdivision
reading: "There is an acceptance of goods within the meaning of this section when the
buyer either before or after the delivery of the goods expresses by words or conduct
his assent to becoming the owner of those specific goods." This enactment would
seem to modify the stringency of the New York rule, for here the statute expressly
permits the use of words to show acceptance. Many jurisdictions did so interpret
this paragraph to allow the words of the buyer in reference to an oral contract to be
used in or'der to show acceptance, when the buyer was in possession of the goods.12
There was a disagreement among the lower courts of New York in the application of
the section cited above, some permitting the words of the buyer to be shown. 13 This
uncertainty has been dispelled by the ruling of the court in the case at bar. The
court did not feel free to adopt the construction of the plaintiff, namely that words
alone could constitute an acceptance, since they were unable to find in this amend.
ment, a sufficient expression of legislative intent "to overturn so long and so settled
a course of decision."
8. Wilson v. Hotchkiss, 171 Cal. 617, 154 Pac. 1 (1915); Devine v. Warner, 75 Conn.
375, 53 At]. 782 (1903); Raldne Realty Corp. v. Brooks, 281 Mass. 233, 183 N. E. 419
(1932); Snider v. Thrall, 56 Wis. 674, 14 N. W. 814 (1883).
9. Edan v. Dudfield, 1 Q. B. 302, 113 Eng. Reprints 1147 (1841).
10. See note 2, supra.
11. N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1911) § 85(3).
12. Raldne Realty Corp. v. Brooks, 281 Mass. 233, 183 N. E. 419 (1932) (no writing
required of sale as property already in possession of buyer); Harlan v. Carney, 219 Mich.
539, 189 N. W. 27 (1922); Kenesaw Mills Elevator Co. v. Aufdenkamp, 106 Neb. 246, 183
N. W. 294 (1921); Mack Co. v. Bear River Milling Co., 63 Utah 565, 227 Pac. 1033 (1924)
(buyer's request for an extension of time as to payment of goods already in his possesIon was
an acceptance taking case out of statute); Wilde v. Zimmerman, 46 Wyo. 530, 30 P. (2d)
148 (1934) (declarations of ownership as well as acts take oral contact out of statute).
13. When this provision became a subject of litigation in the lower courts of New York,
a cleavage of opinion attended its interpretation and its effect on the old rule. Municipal and
Supreme Courts have held and pointed out on numerous occasions that the enactment
of the Uniform Sales Act did change to an appreciable degree the old Statute of Frauds
in reference to an acceptance and receipt which will take an oral contract of sale out
of the statute. Carroll v. Scbmolock, 164 N. Y. Supp. 415 (Sup. Ct., 1917) ("the
law is now, no act or conduct need be shown; mere words suffice"); Flanigan v,
Waterman, 117 Misc. 617, 191 N. Y. Supp. 646 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (acceptance shown
by acknowledgement of the buyer to outsiders); Borenco Importing Co. v. Sperber,
118 Misc. 563, 194 N. Y. Supp. 132 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Gafers-Hinman Co. v. Wessel, 132
Misc. 907, 230 N. Y. Supp. 561 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (acceptance shown by phone conversation
during transit of goods to buyer). Yet the Appellate Division, when confronted with this
problem, laid the foundation of its opinion on the older cases which followed the Shindler
Case. It did not pass on the merits of the pertinent provision of the Sales Act beyond the
extent of saying "although the Statute of Frauds was definite and certain prior to the enact-
ment of Section 85 of Personal Property Law it has been made more so by recent legisla-
tion. It now reads in reference to a receipt of goods 'actually receive the same.'" Broom v.
Joelson, 211 A. D. 157, 161, 206 N. Y. Supp. 841, 844 (Ist Dep't 1924) (buyer's consent to
store merchandise in a seller's factory did not constitute acceptance and delivery by the
buyer and the oral contract was not enforced).
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To criticize this decision would only be tantamount to disagreeing with the judicial
approach of the majority of the court. In their desire to keep the law predictable,
they would deviate from the long standing rule only if forced by the clearest legisla-
tive direction. This they could not find. Yet a perusal of the statute reveals that
words alone may constitute acceptance under the statute. True, it does not treat
of receipt thus lending force to the belief that acts would still be necessary to show
receipt. To have so construed this section of the Sales Act as to relax the former rule
requiring acts for both acceptance and receipt would not have been original or in any
sense revolutionary since other jurisdictions have done so, and commentators have
vigorously asserted such construction to be the correct one. 14 It is suggested that a
more liberal interpretation of the statute involved would have created no harm; one
authority maintains an ameliorating effect would result. It is pointed out that this
particular section of the Statute of Frauds is an actual aid to the fraudulently minded,
since it prevents an investigation of whether one has committed a deliberate fraud
by breaking his oral promise.Y5 Such an interpretation would likewise place this
jurisdiction in accord with a rule generally adopted, and finally give an altogether
reasonable view of the mooted section of the Uniform Sales Act.
14. 1 W iasro-x, SALEs (2d ed. 1924) § 87; Burdic:, A Statute In Prorolins Fraud
(1916) 16 CoL. L. REV. 273, 279. "This certainly abrogates the rule that acts as distinct
from words are necessary to consfitte accentance.'; 2 NruLts-ro:z o:, Co:,.rs (Rev. Ed.
1936) § 554, 557. RFSTATmEn.T, Coh,-AcTs (1932) § 202.
15. Burdick, A Statute For Prorotifng Fraud (1916) 16 Co.. L. Rmv. 273.
